One of Vladimir Putin’s early successes in his full-scale war against Ukraine was his threat to deploy nuclear weapons.
How this was successful was that it stopped Ukraine’s allies from giving Kyiv weapons like tanks and fighter jets, citing fears that doing so could lead to escalation including Putin possibly using nuclear weapons.
Fast forward and approaching two years since the invasion, the West has gone on to provide those types of arms to Kyiv and there has been no nuclear response from the Russian President.
China, which doesn’t want to use its significant influence to broker an end to the war, has been firm in its objections to the use and threats to use nuclear weapons, although it should be noted is rapidly expanding its own nuclear stocks.
While the early phase of the war saw Russia attack Europe’s largest reactor, the Zaphorizia nuclear plant in an act that was condemned by the International Atomic Energy Agency because of its recklessness, the threat and attention paid to the potential use of nuclear weapons has since abated.
This is despite Putin quitting an arms control treaty with the US and his promise to transfer nukes to neighbouring Belarus (more on that below).
Does that mean the threat has faded?
Last week I attended a briefing by William Alberque from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, and formerly of NATO, at Arundel House in London.
He has been studying what we know - and just as crucially what we don’t know - about Russia’s military thought and doctrine when it comes to how it might use non-strategic nuclear weapons.
He presented his research to a select group of journalists ahead of its release today.
This is my summary of his findings and what they tell us about what we should look for and how we can interpret Putin’s statements and actions when it comes to understanding Russia’s nuclear intentions.
Strategic vs non-strategic nuclear weapons
Firstly, non-strategic nuclear weapons, the kind this report will discuss, are those designed for use on the battlefield and in theatre wars involving Europe and Asia and have a range of less than 5500 kilometres.
This is opposed to strategic nuclear weapons that are designed for use by Russia and the United States against cities and industrial heartlands, aimed at eroding a nation’s ability to wage war.
Non-strategic nuclear weapons can be delivered in the following ways:
Aircraft dropping free-fall and guided bombs, ballistic and cruise missiles
Artillery deploying shells and rockets
Nuclear land mines
Short and medium-range missiles
Submarines and warships deploying land-attack missiles as well as anti-ship missiles
Alberque says a large part of Russia’s modern thinking on how it uses nuclear weapons dates back to Soviet doctrine and is viewed by Putin as a tool that he can use to:
coerce adversaries
control escalation both in scenarios where conflict exists (eg Ukraine) and where it doesn’t but is at risk
discourage external powers from getting involved
force its enemy to the negotiating table on its terms
prevent a war from escalating to a ‘theatre’ level ie. involving NATO as well as preventing a war from escalating to a ‘strategic’ level ie. war between the US and Russia on their homelands
Alberque assesses that Russia has been successful in deterring the US and NATO from becoming involved militarily, but failed in trying to prevent them from arming Ukraine with certain capabilities (fighter jets which are on the way and long-range missiles are key examples).
How many non-strategic nuclear weapons does Russia likely have?
That’s unknown. The Federation of American Scientists has the most-quoted guestimate of 1900 but Alberque reckons this is at the low end and could be as many as 3000.
‘The fact is, our numbers are based almost entirely on guesswork, and, in the end, we just don’t know how many there are, how many they actually dismantled after the end of the Cold War versus how many they put into deep storage,’ he said.
His report studies both military doctrine and thought but pays a great deal of attention to Russia’s actions and what intent these betray.
Russia wants nuclear options
According to Alberque, using nuclear weapons is no empty threat.
This is shown in many ways but mostly by the build-up of weaponry that is capable of using both conventional and nuclear warheads. Russia wants options to threaten to either prevent the US from intervening in a localised war (current examples are Georgia and Ukraine) or to keep a war at the theatre level (for example NATO) without involving strikes on Russian territory.
Using nuclear weapons is also a back-up-against-a-wall option, ie. if Russia felt it was losing.
Additionally, because Russia has become bogged down in Ukraine, and has used up a lot of conventional military kit, its reliance on non-strategic weapons to ‘deter and defeat NATO’ has increased.
‘Will Russia with conventional forces depleted, rely more in the future, short-term and medium-term, on theatre nuclear weapons in order to deter the West? I think absolutely yes, but we don’t know,’ Alberque said.
‘Soberisation’ and ‘dosing’
When Alberque was briefing us, I was struck by two words he used: ‘soberisation’ and ‘dosing.’
‘This is something they talk about all the time - soberisation, how do you sober up the Americans when they’re drunk on their own successes and thinking about doing things that Russia doesn’t want,’ he said.
‘So it’s the proper dosage of nuclear weapons to keep the war from escalating out of their control.
‘How many strikes will they need to do to get the US to back down?’
Some Russian papers are even called Soberisation of the Enemy, according to Alberque, who stresses the goal is always to control escalation, and, whenever possible, keep United States out of its wars.
This is essentially the idea of calculating the fine balance of ‘escalating to de-escalate.’
‘What is the correct number of warheads and what size to limit the conflict, to signal resolve to the other side, but to prevent them from having to escalate,’ Alberque explained.
For example, there would be a difference in response depending on what was targeted, for example, if Russia hit a civilian, military or open-ocean target.
Russia’s performance in Ukraine could see the dosing level upped
Interestingly, Ukraine’s ability to shoot down Russia’s use of conventional missiles - the air-launched Kinzhal and the ground-deployed Iskanders - could lead to a more escalated use of nuclear weapons should Putin decide to go down this route.
As Alberque explained, Russia has always said these missiles could penetrate air defences. But if Ukraine is able to shoot some of them down, ‘does that mean Russia will have less confidence in small soberisation strikes or dosing will this mean they need to increase the dose to ensure that one or two get through?’
So, if 20 were needed to ensure two hit targets, suddenly this level of usage doesn’t appear ‘limited’ and that could inadvertently lead to the escalation by drawing in external forces, that the very strikes were aimed at deterring.
So are there nukes in Belarus?
Around Christmas, Alexander Lukashenko claimed that Russia had completed transferring some nuclear weapons to Belarus.
Last week, Belarus released a new military doctrine that included for the first time the use of nuclear weapons.
But although images show the facilities that would store such weapons are set up and have been given a freshen-up, Alberque doesn’t believe deliveries have occurred, yet.
‘I do not believe that nuclear weapons are currently stored permanently in Belarus,’ Alberque said.
‘It may be that they moved one in and out as proof-of-concept, but they certainly are preparing themselves for the option of permanent storage at a later date, should they choose to do so.’
Part of transferring nuclear weapons to Belarus means Russia can permanently station troops there to guard the weapons and ensure their secure transit through Belarus.
But this is unlikely as long as there is a possibility of another civilian uprising against Lukashekno, a dictator and puppet of Putin’s, while Russia’s troops are busy with their war on Ukraine.
Once that war ends and Russia’s troops are freed up for other missions, Alberque said, he expects nuclear weapons to follow into Belarus.
Summary
Alberque doesn’t think Putin would use a nuclear weapon against a NATO country, as that would invite an all-out conflict with the targetted country and her allies, including the United States.
So if Putin were to use a tactical nuke it would be more likely against Ukraine which wants to be a part of NATO and part of its collective protection, something NATO members won’t allow while it is at war with Russia.
But Alberque doesn’t believe Putin will use a nuclear weapon.
‘I doubt it but it’s not impossible,’ he said.
Putin, he argued, had too much to lose but so would the world.
‘‘I think you’d see a nuclear cascade around the world with tremendously deleterious consequences,’ he said of that scenario.
But he caveated this by pointing to the Russian leader’s incredibly narrow decision-making and his echo chamber.
It is also worth noting that we are approaching year two of a war that has been brutally fought by Russia and has included attacks aimed at civilians and civilian infrastructure, the use of landmines and trench warfare - a style of combat we thought we consigned to history last century.
The poltical environment makes a difference in how the 'soberisation' works (or how Putin expects it to work). I can see it going two ways in 2025
* A more predictable US administration (aka Biden), or
* A more amenable US administration (aka Trump).
I fear that Putin prefers the later, and for that reason, I expect a lot of covert interference in the upcoming US election.